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DEATH IN CONTEXT
ROGER B. DWORKINt
"[I]n this world nothing is certain but death and taxes."*
Benjamin Franklin
Taxes may remain inevitable,' but death no longer appears as cer-
tain as it did to Benjamin Franklin less than two hundred years ago.
Heart-lung machines, respirators, organ transplants and chronic dialysis
now prolong the life (in some sense of the term) of persons who not long
ago would have died in short order. Developments in genetics may pro-
mise a future of spare parts banks to provide the goods to prolong life
indefinitely. Less dramatic developments in nutrition, health care delivery
etc. give all of us an increased life expectancy. Simultaneously, new knowl-
edge about the brain has rendered conventional notions of death obsolete
in the eyes of many, including leading scientists and physicians.2 We
no longer know when or what death is, but we do know that whatever
it is, it occurs later in man's cycle than it used to and that it can be fought
off for ever increasing lengths of time.
The new uncertainty of death has given rise to a spate of efforts to
define or redefine it.' Numerous authors have explained that the old
t Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law. I wish to thank
Stephen J. Johnson, J.D. 1973, Indiana University School of Law for significant
research assistance.
* Letter to M. Leroy (1789).
1. The scientific developments which have sparked the death definition debate in
which this article is an entry have also posed interesting taxation problems which prob-
ably even Franklin could not have anticipated. See, Note, Tax Consequences of Trans-
fers of Bodily Parts, 73 COLum. L. REv. 842 (1973).
2. See, e.g., Ad Hoe Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine
the Definition of Brain Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J.A.M.A. 337
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Committee].
3. See, e.g., Berman, The Legal Problems of Organ Transplantation, 13 VILL. L.
REV. 751 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Berman] ; Bi6rcc, When, Is Death?, 1968 Wis.
L. REv. 484 [hereinafter cited as Bibrck] ; Capron & Kass, A Statutory Definition of
the Standards for Determining Human Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 121 U.
PA. L. REv. 87 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Capron & Kass]; Elkinton, The Dying
Patient, The Doctor, and the Law, 13 VIr. L. REv. 740 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as Elkinton] ; Halley & Harvey, On An Interdisciplinary Solution to the Legal-Medical
Definitional Dilemma in Death, 2 IND. LEGAL F. 219 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Halley
& Harvey]; Potter, The Paradoxical Preservation of a Principle, 13 VILL. L. REv.
784 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Potter]; Wasmuth, The Concept of Death, 30 OHIO
ST. L.J. 32 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Wasmuth] ; Wassmer, Between Life and
Death: Ethical and Moral Issues Involved in Recent Medical Advances, 13 VILL. L. REv.
759 (1968) ; Comment, The Criteria for Determining Death in Vital Organ Transplants
-A Medico-Legal Dilemma, 38 Mo. L. REv. 220 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Com-
ment].
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notion of death, the oessation of heartbeat and respiration, is no longer
adequate because: (1) it does not accord with the best current medical
knowledge; (2) it creates a dilemma for physicians whose patients will
never regain consciousness, but whose heart and lungs continue to func-
tion (albeit with mechanical assistance) ; and (3) if cessation of heart-
beat and respiration constitutes death and if a beating heart is necessary
for transplantation, the transplantation of a heart will require removing
it while it is beating, thereby causing the doctor to have "killed" his
patient.
These authors share certain premises, some of which seem to me to
be wrong, and none of which seems sufficiently clear to constitute a pre-
mise rather than a conclusion. They all begin with the notion that there
are such things as life and death and that each is a unitary concept."
They all accept the need to define death and to reach agreement on its defi-
nition.5 They accept as inevitable the central role of the physician in the
determination of death and the need for the law to define death in a manner
acceptable to physicians because: (1) the law should be as accurate as
possible, and a law which does not follow the wisdom of experts is :"a
ass; ' (2) physicians will most often be the persons in a position to
make decisions affecting death, and they cannot be controlled effectively
by inexpert, far-removed courts applying notions with which they dis-
agree;" and (3) physicians are exposed to the risk of civil or criminal
penalties in the process of determining whether death occurred, and it
is unfair to impose liability on terms they find unacceptable.' Paradoxi-
cally, the authors who seek to define death agree that death is not merely
a medical question; consequently, they do not believe doctors should
define death, but only that the definition must be acceptable to doctors and
should accord with current medical thinking.
The distinction between allowing doctors to define death and de-
4. See, e.g., Bi~rck, supra note 3, at 487; Capron & Kass, supra note 3, at
106, 111, 115; Halley & Harvey, supra note 3, at 237; Wasmuth, supra note 3, at
49, 55.
5. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 3, at 751; Capron & Kass, supra note 3, at
95-97, 99; Halley & Harvey, supra note 3, at 221. Wasmuth, supra note 3, at 33 n.4;
Comment, supra note 3, at 234. The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare's
Commission on Medical Malpractice believes that the question of the legal definition
of death is so important that the definition should be enacted into law only by the
United States Congress. HEW, REPORT OF THE SECRETARYS CoMMISSION ON MmICAL
MALPRActicE 31 n. 10 (1973).
6. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 3, at 753-59; Halley & Harvey, supra note 3,
at 229, 236; Comment, supra note 3, at 230-31, 234; cf. Elldnton, supra note 3, at
745.
7. See Capron & Kass, supra note 3, at 96; cf. Elkinton, supra note 3, at 746-47.
8. Berman, supra note 3, at 753; 4. Bi5rck, spra note 3, at 494-95.
9. Capron & Kass, supra note 3, at 93-94; Halley & Harvey, supra note 3, at
224; Potter, supra note 3, at 791. But see Berman, supra note 3, at 753.
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fining it in a way doctors find acceptable is an example of another shared
premise of the new definers of death. They all accept the utility of fine
analytical distinctions and insist, for example, on the importance of dif-
ferentiating between the questions of when a person is dead and when
(if ever) he should be allowed to die.'" Likewise, they would distin-
guish the question of the definition of death from the actual determina-
tion of whether death has occurred." Finally, they all agree that organ
transplantation ought to be facilitated,12 although they concede the need
to protect potential organ donors from overly eager transplant surgeons.' 3
Unsurprisingly, these premises lead the writers who share them to
similar conclusions. They all propose a unitary definition of death which
recognizes that a person with irreversible loss of brain function is dead.
This definition is to be enacted into law by legislatures and applied by
courts, but among its principal virtues is its acceptability to physicians.
Physicians are to develop and apply the criteria for recognizing that
death has occured, and they are to be left free to use the conventional
signs (cessation of heartbeat and respiration) when circumstances sug-
gest this as the most practical basis for action. This approach maximizes
the doctor's ability for flexible response, and permits vital organ trans-
plantation without fear of liability.'4  I
The best of the recent attempts to grapple with the problem of the
definition of death is the work of Professor Alexander Morgan Capron
and Dr. Leon R. Kass, " who acknowledge that the need of transplant
surgeons to obtain organs in good condition has stimulated work in
this area.'" Professor Capron and Dr. Kass ask whether the public should
10. The clearest statement of the importance of the distinction is found in Capron
& Kass, mspra note 3, at 105-06.
11. See id. at 93; Elkinton, supra note 3, at 745; Halley & Harvey, sipra note 3,
at 224.
12. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 3, at 751; Elkinton, supra note 3, at 746-47.
13. See, e.g., Elkinton, mipra note 3, at 746-47.
14. See generally authorities cited note 3 supra at pages indicated in notes 4-13
supra. The difficulty of distinguishing premises from conclusions is suggestive of the
reason for what appears to me to be the unsatisfactory nature of the death definition
literature. Writings about death have more of the characteristics of pronouncements
than argumentation. Professor Capron and Dr. Kass are the most successful at
avoiding this conclusory approach. For that among other reasons I have dealt at some
length with their views. Text accompanying notes 15-36 inf'ra.
15. Capron & Kass, supra note 3. My reference to the Capron & Kass article
as "[t]he best of the recent attempts" is by no means meant to be faint praise or
condescension. Although I disagree with their premises and hence their conclusions,
I think their work is very good. I trust that no disrespect will be thought to inhere
in disagreeing with an earlier work of a fellow participant in this Symposium and
that all will understand that I mean merely to accept Professor Capron and Dr. Kass's
invitation to join "what we hope will be a robust and well-informed public debate ..
Id. at 118.
16. Id. at 89. Perhaps this motivation explains the disquiet which Professor
Capron and Dr. Kass note, id. at 91, in the responses of both the lay community and
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be involved in defining death, and conclude that public participation is
necessary because many aspects of an acceptable definition of death are
outside medical competence.' They observe that formulation of the con-
cept of death is at least partly a philosophical question which requires
more than technical expertise for its resolution."8 Noting that the
question of when death occurs is now shrouded in confusion," Professor
Capron and Dr. Kass call for "a clear and acceptable standard."2
They believe the public should be involved in formulating this
standard, and that it should be formulated by legislatures:
Reliance on judge-made law would. . . neither actively involve
the public in the decisionmaking process nor lead to a prompt,
clear, and general "definition." . . . A need to rely on the
courts reflects an uncertainty in the law which is unfortunate
in an area where private decisionmakers (physicians) must act
quickly and irrevocably. An ambiguous legal standard en-
dangers the rights-and in some cases the lives--of the partici-
pants. In such circumstances, a person's choice of one course
over another may depend more on his willingness to test his
views in court than on the relative merits of the courses of
action ....
Uncertainties in the law are, to be sure, inevitable at times
and are often tolerated if they do not involve matters of general
applicability or great moment. Yet the question of whether and
when a person is dead plainly seems the sort of issue that can-
not escape the need for legal clarity on these grounds."1
Professor Capron and Dr. Kass bolster their plea for a legislative solu-
tion by making the standard arguments in favor of legislative ap-
proaches,22 and adding that those who want physicians to control the
definition of death are content to leave the matter to the courts because
they believe the courts will adopt the consensus view of the medical pro-
fession. 8
parts of the medical profession to the so-called Harvard Committee's now famous
adoption of the concept of irreversible coma (brain death) as defining the end of life.
See Harvard Committee, supra note 2.
17. Capron & Kass, supra note 3, at 93.
18. Id. at 94.
19. "Id.
20. Id. at 95.
21. Id. at 96-97.
22. As compared to legislatures, courts operate in narrow confines and lack
the staff, expertise and authority to obtain enough information to act wisely. Id.
23. Id. at 97.
626
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They also reject the desirability of employing different definitions
of death in transplant cases and in other cases because employing dif-
ferent standards "would create chaos,"24 and they state that
certainly it cannot be successfully argued that there should be
one concept of death which applies to one type of litigation
while an entirely different standard applies in other areas.25
Later they observe:
By indicating that the various standards for measuring death
relate to a single phenomenon legislation can serve to reduce a
primary source of public uneasiness on this subject. Once it
has been established that certain consequences-for example,
burial, autopsy, transfer of property to the heirs, and so forth-
follow from a determination of death, definite problems would
arise if there were a number of "definitions" according to which
some people could be said to be "more dead" than others ...
One wonders . . . whether it does not appear somewhat
foolish for the law to offer a number of arbitrary definitions
of a natural phenomenon such as death. Nevertheless, legislators
might seek to identify a series of points during the process of
dying, each of which might be labelled "death" for certain pur-
poses. Yet so far as we know, no arguments have been pre-
sented for special purpose standards except in the area of organ
transplantation.28
Rejecting the notion of special purpose statutes27 and stressing the
importance of keeping separate the questions of whether someone is dead
and whether he should be allowed to die,2" Professor Capron and Dr.
Kass propose a statute defining death.29 Their statute, which permits
the use of cessation of spontaneous brain function as a criterion for deter-
24. Id. at 99 n.46.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 106.
27. Id. at 106-08.
28. Id. at 105-06.
29. A person will be considered dead if in the announced opinion of a
physician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice, he has experienced
an irreversible cessation of spontaneous respiratory and circulatory functions.
In the event that artificial means of support preclude a determination that
these functions have ceased, a person will be considered dead if in the an-
nounced opinion of a physician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice,
he has experienced an irreversible cessation of spontaneous brain functions.
Death will have occurred at the time when the relevant functions ceased.
Id. at 111.
627
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
mining the occurrence of death,8° leaves open the possibility of relying cn
traditional criteria where appropriate." It is flexible so that the standards
to be applied can respond to changes in medical technology.2 And unlike
the best known death definition statute,33 the Capron-Kass proposal does
not speak of being "medically and legally dead thus avoiding . . . the
mistaken implication that the 'medical' and 'legal' definitions could dif-
fer." 4 The proposed statute is "predicated upon the single phenomenon
of death," and applies uniformly to everyone." Finally, while Professor
Capron and Dr. Kass seem less concerned about facilitating organ trans-
plants than some writers, adoption of their proposal would have that
result."
The Capron-Kass proposal is intelligently conceived and developed,
and given its premises it may well be as good a solution to the death de-
finition problem as we are likely to find. Regrettably, however, I believe
its premises are wrong and that the entire spate of death definition litera-
ture, of which the work of Professor Capron and Dr. Kass is the best,
misses the boat entirely.
The effort devoted to defining death is wasted at best, counter-
productive at worst. The modern writers on death have failed to ask the
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 108, 113.
33. A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, in the opinion
of a physician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice, there is the
absence of spontaneous respiratory and cardiac function and, because of the
disease or condition which caused, directly or indirectly, these functions to
cease, or because of the passage of time since these functions ceased, attempts
at resuscitation are considered hopeless; and, in this event, death will have
occurred at the time these functions ceased;
or A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, in the opinion
of a physician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice, there is the
absence of spontaneous brain function; and if based on ordinary standards
of medical practice, during reasonable attempts to either maintain or restore
spontaneous circulatory or respiratory function in the absence of aforesaid
brain function, it appears that further attempts at resuscitation or supportive
maintenance will not succeed, death will have occurred at the time when these
conditions first coincide. Death is to be pronounced before artificial means of
supporting respiratory and circulatory function are terminated and before
any vital organ is removed for purposes of transplantation.
These alternative definitions of death are to be utilized for all purposes
in this state, including the trials of civil and criminal cases, any laws to the
contrary notwithstanding.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (Supp. 1972).
34. Capron & Kass, supra note 3, at 115.
35. Id. at 111.
36. Any time cessation of spontaneous brain function is used as the indicator
of death, transplantation of organs like the heart is facilitated by allowing the heart
to be removed while mechanical devices are keeping it healthy and beating.
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most basic question about the death definition problem: What differ-
ence does it make whether somebody is dead? That question places the
issue of death into the only posture in which it can be of relevance to the
law-the posture of context or consequences. Whatever may be the needs
of the philosopher or the ethicist, the lawyer needs only to know what
consequences follow upon a given determination. Only if we are per-
suaded that one definition of death will always lead to the correct resolu-
tion of legal problems do we need to search for such a definition.
Why might a lawyer want to know whether somebody was dead?
As noted previously, most current discussion focuses on the problems of
organ transplantation and "pulling the plug" on dying (or dead?)
patients." In fact, these dramatic situations are among the least sig-
nificant reasons for wanting to know whether someone is dead.
As a practical matter the questions of whether and when death has
occurred control many legal problems. Obviously, all wrongful death
actions, whether or not they involve special situations such as transplan-
tation or cessation of extraordinary care can be brought only after death.
Similarly, death is a prerequisite to a successful prosecution for homi-
cide ;" in many states the time of death is critically important because a
murder conviction can only be obtained if death occurs within a year and
a day of the fatal blow.3" Medical advances may affect the results of cases
under the year and a day rule, but they did not create the need to deter-
mine the time of death.
Numerous property and wealth transmission issues raise death ques-
tions: When may an estate be probated?" When may property of a
testate or intestate decedent be distributed?"' When does a life estate
end?' 2 When does property pass to a surviving joint tenant?"' When do
life insurance benefits become payable44 and health insurance benefits
cease to accrue?" When may property escheat?46 When do agents,
37. See text accompanying notes 3 & 16 supra.
38. See, e.g., WASHi. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.48.020 (1961).
39. IV. LAFAVE & A. ScOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 35, at 266-67, §
67, at 534 (1972) [hereinafter cited as LAFAE & Scott].
40. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 29-2-6-1 (Code ed. 1972).
41. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 553:18 (1955).
42. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, § 911 (1965); S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. § 21-44-15 (1967) ; Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 34-97 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
43. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 118-2-2 to -3 (1963) ; GA. CoDE ANN. 2
113-2904 (Supp. 1972) ; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-501 (1964) ; N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTos
§ 1211 (MeKinney 1963); OK.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, § 911 (1965); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 34-97 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
44. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 153-20-9 (1963).
45. See Halley & Harvey, supra note 3, at 223-24 & n.7.
46. See MicH. Coup. LAWS ANN. § 567.47 (1967).
47. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 2356 (West 1954), as amended, (West Supp.
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conservators, 48 attorneys49 and trustees"0 lose their authority to act, and
when do banks become liable for admitting persons to safe deposit boxes"1
and paying money out of accounts?52 When is an estate tax due?"
When is a gift within three years of death so that it may be said to be in
contemplation of death?"- And perhaps most importantly, who died
first in the event that persons with interests in one another's estates per-
ished in a common disaster?"
Status relationships often turn on whether someone is dead. For
example, whether a person who remarries is a bigamist 6 and whether
the remarriage is valid5" may both turn on whether the prior spouse is
or is deemed to be alive or dead. Whether one may be a voter"
or elected to an office 9 may depend on whether and when he died. In
addition crimes besides homicide and bigamy may depend on someone's
being dead or alive. 0 Coroners' obligations"' and the mandatory con-
tents of death certificates0 2 require determinations of the time of death.
And occasional unusual statutes"3 make other matters turn on whether
and when someone died, and even in one situation," on whether a
physician thinks his patient is "at the point of death."
1973) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 709.01 (1969); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 2-305(2) (1968);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 3-01-11 (1959).
48. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-873(B) (1956); HAWAII Rzv. STAT. §
551-48 (1968); IND. ANN. STAT. § 29-2-8-3 (Code ed. 1972); Ky. REV. STAT. 5
384.070 (1971).
49. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 37A, § 46 (1958); OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, §
1056(a) (2) (Supp. 1972).
50. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 523 (Smith-Hurd 1961).
51. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 55.10 (1970).
52. See UNiFoaa COMMERCIAL CoDE § 4-405.
53. See 26 U.S.C. § 2001 (1970).
54. See id. § 2035.
55. See UNIFORM SIMULTANEOUS DEATH AcT.
56. See, e. g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 282 (West 1970); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §
153-20-4 (1963); IND. ANN. STAT. § 34-3-4-1 (Code ed. 1973). See also note 76
infra & text accompanying.
57. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.01 (1969); Moxi. REv. CODES ANN. § 48-111
(1961).
58. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-150 (Supp. 1972), amending (1956);
FIA. STAT. ANN. § 98.301 (1960); IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1-22-14 (Code ed. 1972).
59. See, e.g., NEv. REv. STAT. § 293.368 (1971).
60. E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-92(a) (3) (1958) (kidnapping in the
first degree); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 135.25 (McKinney 1967) (kidnapping in the first
degree) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-02-33 (1970) (failure to fill out a death certificate).
61. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH: & SA=rY CODE § 10252 (West 1964).
62. See, e.g., id. § 10225; WiS. STAT. ANN. § 69.38 (1965).
63. See, e.g., Ccmo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 153-20-9, -10 (1963) (determines when
statute of limitations begins to run) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-1803 (1955) (same) ; N.D.
CENT. CODE § 34-03-03 (1972) (termination of employment by death of employer) ; id. §
47-16-18 (1960) (termination of lease).
64. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 120 (Cum. Supp. 1970) (permitting physician to
appear and apply for marriage license for patient "at the point of death" and other-
630
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It would be odd indeed if all these different situations were sus-
ceptible to resolution by one definiton of death. They involve different
consequences and resolutions of different policy questions. In all of them
death is not important in its own right but is merely a shorthand descrip-
tion of when certain events are to occur. When everyone agreed on what
death meant, the shorthand might have been convenient, although even
then different meanings attached to the notion of death in different con-
texts. 5 Now that agreement no longer exists and that an awakened sense
of medical progress may suggest continuing evolution in our understand-
ing of death, any potential convenience has been lost. A few examples
should suffice.
I think most people would agree that a person who purposely shoots
a gun at another person in an effort to kill him ought be punished very
severely because he "deserves" severe punishment; such punishment is
necessary to discourage him or others from repeating such acts; or his
conduct manifests a degree of dangerousness that requires long-term re-
moval from society in order to incapacitate or rehabilitate him.66 None
of the reasons for imposing severe punishment is affected by whether
the victim dies. Therefore, his fortuitous survival ought in no way affect
the degree of punishment inflicted on his attacker. Whether the attacker
caused his victim's death is thus theoretically irrelevant to the questions
of whether and (more realistically) how severely he ought to be punished.
Surely the timing of the victim's death is absolutely irrelevant.
Nonetheless, the law of homicide does require a showing that the
defendant caused his victim's death,6" and the time of death may affect
whether the killing was murder or manslaughter." While recognizing the
lack of a sound theoretical base for such requirements, the drafters of the
Model Penal Code suggest that the causation requirement reflects com-
mon reactions and that juries would nullify an attempt to convict of the
most serious crime persons who try but fail to kill their victims.69 Con-
ceding the correctness of the Model Penal Code's view of reality, it sug-
gests at most a practical reason for requring a result in homicide
statutes. Given the lack of theoretical base for such a causation require-
ment, the sole policy supporting it is a desire to avoid jury nullification.
Thus, for homicide cases the law need only adopt a view of death suf-
wise entitled to marry).
65. See notes 75-101 infra & text accompanying.
66. For the best short discussion of the reasons or justifications for punishment
see H. PAc:ER, THE LIMITs OF THE CRIaNAL SANcrioN 35-61 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as PACKER].
67. LAFAvE & SconT, supra note 39, § 67, at 534.
6S. See id. § 35, at 266-67.
69. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03, Comment (Tent Draft No. 4, 1955).
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ficient to serve that policy. I should think, then, that for homicide that
approach which made convictions easiest to obtain ought be adopted.
This would probably involve selecting the broadest definition of death, or
if we must retain the year and a day rule, the one which permits a find-
ing that death occurred at the earliest time. Alternatively, it might require
adoption of the most commonsense view of death (cessation of heartbeat
and respiration) since juries are the decisionmakers thought to be re-
levant.
None of these considerations, however, has any bearing on organ
transplantation policy. If we believe that encouraging organ transplants
is important, we should adopt the broad and early view of when a person
is dead. If, on the other hand, our primary concern is for the protection
of the dreadfully ill or injured who have healthy hearts rather than those
who are dreadfully ill because they need a healthy heart, then the defini-
tion which is most restrictive and delays the determination of death until
as late as possible ought to be adopted. If some middle ground between
the extremes is sought, a full consideration of all factors at stake might
be pursued without ever asking the question which stops, rather than aids,
analysis: Is the potential donor dead? In no event are the policies re-
levant to purposely shooting healthy people involved in deciding when to
transplant organs. If the answers to the questions of when may we im-
prison an attacker for life and when may a doctor transplant a heart are
the same, it is a mere coincidence; and if the same law of homicide that
governs the attacker threatens the doctor, then the fault lies with the law
of homicide and our criminal law's refusal to consider motive,7 and not
with our definition of death.
Similarly, property transmission involves considerations wholly
different from those involved in organ transplantation and the law of
homicide. A state might well recognize in any particular case that the
chance of a return to health, productivity or even consciousness would be
so slight as not to justify depriving a surviving spouse and children of
the material goods in a "sick?" "dead?" "dying?" person's estate without
deciding to extinguish that small chance by allowing the person's heart
to be removed.
The Uniform Simultaneos Death Act7 determines, as far as the
law is concerned, when persons who perish simultaneously have died.
The purpose of this act is to prevent disputes that would otherwise arise
between claimants to estates.72 Society suffers no harm from concluding
for some purposes that A predeceased B and for others that B predeceasecl
70. See generally LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 39, § 29, at 204-07.
71. UNIFoRM SIMLTANEOUS DEATH ACT.
72. Id., Commissioner's Prefatory Note.
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A, when, in fact, no one knows whether A or B "really" died first.
Furthermore, the considerations which lead to these determinations obvi-
ously have no relevance to the law of homicide or organ transplantation.
Additional examples could be given, but little is served by beating a
horse who either lacks heartbeat and respiration or who registers a flat
EEG. Amazingly, the current definers of death not only overlook the
obvious point that death only matters in terms of its consequences, but
also ignore the fact that the law has long recognized that death occurs at
different times for different purposes." The suggestion that no one can
successfully argue for different concepts of death for different purposes
and that no arguments have been made for special purpose standards ex-
cept in transplant cases 4 ignores the fact that different concepts of death
do exist for different purposes. Even without the blessing of the com-
mentators, the successful operation of the law may be thought a fairly
persuasive argument in itself.
A presumption of death is a legal determination that death has oc-
curred. Common contexts in which presumptive death problems arise
involve property distribution and bigamy. For property distribution
purposes most states presume the death of a person who has been absent
from home without tidings for a period of time, usually seven years."
Yet twenty-one of those states provide a shorter presumptive death period,
usually five years, when the issue in dispute is whether the spouse of the
absent person committed bigamy by remarrying." Such a distinction is
73. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 75-76 infra.
74. Capron & Kass, supra note 3, at 99, 106.
75. E.g., Auiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-509 (1956); CAL. Evm. CODE § 667
(XVest 1966) ; DEL. CODE ANx. tit. 12, §§ 1105, 1701-12 (1953); D.C. CODE ENCYCL.
ANN. §§ 14-701 to 02 (1966); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 734-32 (1964); GA. CODE ANN.§ 113-2601 (1959); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2704 (1964); K.y. REv. STAT. ANN. §
422.130 (1972); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2701 (1964); MIcir. Comp. LAWS
ANN. §§ 705.1-.2 (1968); Miss. CODE ANN. 8 13-1-23 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 490.620 (1952) ; MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 93-1301-7(26) (1964); NEB. REV. STAT. §
30-1902 (1964) (but see id. § 30-2012) ; NEv. REv. STAT. § 47.250(14) (1967); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 3A:40-1 (Supp. 1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. 8 31-14-1 (1953) ; N.D. CENT. CODE §§
31-11-03(26), -04 (1960) ; OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2121.01 (Page 1968); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 58, §§ 941, 946 (1965) ; ORE. REv. STAT. 8 41.360(26) (1971); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 20, § 5701(b) (Spec. Pamphlet 1972) ; id. tit. 48, § 1-8(b) (1965) ; S.D. ComPILED
LAWs ANN. §§ 21-44-17, 30-5-5 (1967) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-1802(2) (1955); TEx.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5541 (1958) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-105 (1973) ; W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 44-9-1 (1966); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 1-190 (1957). Other states presume death
from a five year absence with various other requirements. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. 8
29-2-5-1 (Code ed. 1972) ; IowA CODE ANN. § 633.510 (1964).
76. Compare Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-271 (1956); CAL. PENAL CODE § 282
(West 1970); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 384 (1953); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. §
22-601 (1967); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 799.02 (1965); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 436.080(1973); MASS. ANN. LAWs ch. 272, § 15 (1968); MIcH. Comr. LAWS ANN. §
750.439 (1968); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-702 (1969); ND. REv. STAT. § 28-903(1964); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.160 (1971); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 579:6 (1955);
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quite sensible. A person ought not lightly be deprived of his property,
and the policies of certainty involved in real property law counsel extreme
caution before distributing the property of a person who may return to
assert a claim to it. On the other hand, the marital rights of an absentee
of five years are difficult to worry about; a preference for marriage
rather than nonmarital relationships is widespread; and the law of bigamy
is exceedingly difficult to justify at all.7" Therefore, the twenty-one states
have acted very intelligently in finding that death occurred earlier for
bigamy purposes than for purposes of wealth distribution.
A number of states explicitly provide for finding that death occurre
at different times for different purposes. In one short subsection of the
"Definitions" section of the Pennsylvania inheritance tax laws, for ex-
ample, "Date of death" is defined as meaning: (1) the date of "actual"
death; except in cases of persons presumed dead, when it means (2) the
date found by decree to be the date of presumed death; provided that
for purposes of determining interest and discount, it means (3) the date
on which the court enters the decree."8
The New York provisions are more complicated. The basic statute
presumes death upon five years' absence without tidings,79 but permits
a finding that death occurred earlier if the person was "exposed to a
specific peril,"8 and provides for the use of different statutory periods
where prescribed.8' Seven years' absence is prescribed as the period neces-
sary for termination of a joint tenancy, tenancy in common or tenancy by
the entirety,82 except that in such cases a one-year absence will suffice
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:92-1 (1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-183 (1969); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12-22-03 (1960) ; OHIo. REv. CODE ANN. § 2905.43 (Page 1954); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 882 (1958); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4503 (1963); S.D. ComPirE
LAWS ANN. § 22-22-15 (1967) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-702 (1955); and TEx. PENAL
CODE ANN. art. 491 (1952) with ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-509 (1956) ; CAL. Evm.
CODE § 667 (West 1966), CAL. PROD. CODE § 280 (West 1956); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
12, §§ 1105, 1701-12 (1953); D.C. CODE ENcyOL. ANN. §§ 14-701 to 02 (1966); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 734.32 (1964); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 422.130 (1972); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 200A, § 2 (1969); id. ch. 203, § 32; MIcH. Coup. LAws ANN. §§ 705.1-.2
(1968); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 93-1301-7(26) (1964); NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-1902(1964) ; NEV. REV. STAT. § 47.250 (1971); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 553:18 (1955); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 3A:40-1 (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 28A-1, -13 (1966); N.D. CENT. CODE§§ 31-11-03 to -04 (1960); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2121.01 (Page 1968); OELA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 58, §§ 941, 946 (1965) (and see id. tit. 84, § 271 (1970)); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
20, § 5701(b) (1972) ; id. tit. 48 §§ 1-8(b) (1965) ; S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 30-5-
5, 21-44-17 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 30-1801, 36-404 (1955); and Tpm. REv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 5541 (1958). See also MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 18 ('1971) (bigamy
provision) ; id. art. 16, §§ 200-212 (1973) (presumption provisions).
77. See generally PAClER, supra note 66, at 312-14.
78. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 2485-102(6) (1964).
79. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.7 (a) (McKinney 1967).
80. Id. § 2-1.7(a) (1).
81. Id. § 2-1.7(a) (2).
82. N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTIONS LAW § 1211(3) (a) (McKinney 1963).
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"upon proof of other circumstances from which the probability that the
missing co-tenant is dead may reasonably be inferred."8 Relief which
extinguishes the estate of a missing person shall not be granted if the
court finds as a fact that the missing person is dead.8" However, such a
finding of death is not to be considered an adjudication of death or be
controlling in any other proceeding in which the missing person's death
is in issue.8" Seven years' absence is also required to presume death in a
proceeding concerning New York personal property or administra-
tion of the estate of a person with personal property in New York "or
upon whose life an estate in real property depends."8 In addition New
York specifically provides a five-year period for dissolution of marriage,"
but waits twenty-five years to determine the death of unknown heirs who
fail to appear to claim their share of the proceeds of a sale.88 Upon the
determination of their death, however, they are presumed to have been
dead at the time of the sale.89 The property of an absentee may be dis-
tributed as if he died ten years after the date he was last seen or heard
from."
Several states demonstrate a belief that there may be a difference
between "real" and "legal" death, but they nonetheless proceed according
to legal standards. Thus, property is distributed and actions taken as if
a person were "really dead"' or "in fact dead" '92 or had suffered "actual
death."93 Moreover, states differ on whether the effects of legal death
are irreversible. New York even has different rules for different proceed-
ings. A New York absentee may not recover his property after a decree
of distribution issues,"4 but an "alleged decedent" who returns may re-
cover some of his property.9" Several other states permit persons pre-
sumed dead to recover some or all of their property,9" and in some cir-
cumstances Tennessee even permits an absentee who returns to find his
83. Id. § 1211(3) (b).
84. Id. §1211(4).
85. Id.
86. N.Y. DECEDENT EsT. LAW § 80-a (McKinney Supp. 1966).
87. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 221 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
88. N.Y. REAL PROP. AcToNs LAW § 991 (1) (McKinney 1963).
89. Id.
90. N.Y. SUmR. CT. PRo. LAW § 911(3) (McKinney Supp. 1972), amending
(McKinney 1967).
91. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2121.05 (Page 1968); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-111
(1973).
92. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44-9-6 (1966).
93. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2121.06 (Page 1968).
94. N.Y. Suaa. CT. PRO. LAW § 911(3) (McKinney Supp. 1972), amending
(McKinney 1967).
95. Id. § 2225 (McKinney 1967).
96. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-509 (1956); Apr. STAT. ANN. §
62-2122 (1971) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 576.15 (1947).
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spouse remarried to "insist upon restoration of conjugal rights. .... 2)97
In Colorado, on the other hand, the validity of a finding of death is not
affected by a later determination that the absentee is alive or was alive
when he was determined to be dead.98
Virginia takes perhaps the most flexible view of what it means to
be dead. In addition to presuming death upon a seven-year absence,"'
Virginia provides a special presumption of death after a six-months
absence for persons in buildings damaged or destroyed by floods resulting
from Hurricane Camille or at sites in the path of such floods."' 0 More-
over, Virginia permits estates and funds to be distributed as if a person
whose interest depends on his being alive at a particular time were dead
at that time, even though it is not known or cannot be shown whether
the person was alive or dead and the legal presumption of death does not
apply.10'
Thus, the law treats people as dead when that seems the best thing
to do. Only by suggesting that there is a difference between being dead
and being treated as if one were dead can anyone argue that the law con-
tains a single concept of death. However, since doing things to people
or their property is the only way the law can demonstrate what it believes
their status to be, such a suggestion would be fanciful.
Why, then, if death is meaningful for the law only in context, and
if the lawmakers already recognize that, would anyone wish to legislate
an all-purpose definition of death?..2 One might seek such a definition
to avoid confusion. As yet, though, no showing of the confusion of the
present law has been made, and one might well wonder what confusion
would result from defining death. A definition that abolished statutory
provisions about death would, at the least, upset countless estate plans
and open many marriages and property titles to question. A definition
which let such provisions stand would be meaningless because presuming
death is merely another way of defining death. Therefore, the definition
and presumption standing together would destroy the uniformity the
definition sought to achieve and leave the definition useful only in the
contexts where it was the best approach to death. In other words, the
all-purpose definition would become a special definition.
97. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-833 (1955).
98. COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 153-20-2(3) (1963).
99. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-105 (1973).
100. Id. § 64.1-105.1.
101. Id. § 64.1-106.
102. Some of the arguments mentioned and (hopefully) refuted here were
offered by participants at an off-the-record Workshop on Medicial Ethics I attended
in July, 1973. The rather strict ground rules regarding nonattribution adopted by my
fellow conferees and me precludes giving further description or credit. I am grateful
to have had the benefit of participating in this lively exchange of views.
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One might argue that people generally believe death is a unitary
concept and that the law should reflect the common understanding.
Granting the assumption that such a common understanding exists, it is
a slender reed on which to build an approach that deviates widely from
present practice and from the normal way the law deals with problems,
and that has no other demonstrable benefits. Moreover, it ignores the
law's role as teacher of the public as well as reflector of present views.
Why should the law take a less sensible position that reflects assump-
tions, rather than a more sensible view that may change erroneous as-
sumptions? Indeed, if the law were only to reflect and never teach, I
suppose we would be stuck for some time with cessation of heartbeat and
respiration as the definition of death.
Seeing the law as a teacher, one might argue that not having a single
definition of death teaches a dangerous lesson: It cheapens life by sug-
gesting that there is a question about what life is and by opening the door
to practices many people believe are bad-such as euthanasia, the killing of
the old and helpless and using one person for the benefit of another.
This argument is largely beside the point and prevents rather than pro-
motes analysis. There is a question about what life is, and playing ostrich
will not make the question go away. Recognizing it in no sense leads to
any conclusion about practices that rightly make people uneasy. Recogni-
tion merely opens the door to analysis. All can agree that killing is bad
without agreeing what killing means or even believing that killing can
never be justified. Surely, no one would seriously contend that the law
teaches a bad moral lesson by recognizing self-defense as a defense to a
prosecution for homicide. Here again, the law looks to context to deter-
mine what legal response is most appropriate.
If one wishes to determine what the law should do about euthanasia,
he can approach the question in either of two ways: by definition or by
analysis. He can define those people who are to be transferred to a status
of indisputable death as dead already, thereby paying lip service to the
sanctity of life while leaving open the question of which people are to fall
into the already dead category. Conversely, he can define them as alive,
thereby either ending discussion since it would be intolerable to kill a
living person or taking the position that killing the living is sometimes
acceptable. Alternatively, the problem could be examined in its entirety.
Analysis does not ignore ethics, but considers it along with economics,
sociology, psychology, judicial administration and all other factors which
bear on a problem. The lack of a definition of death does not lead to a
decision for euthanasia; it leads to an opportunity to consider the question
freed of automatic answers. Rather than teach that human life is cheap,
recognition that it cannot be defined may increase reverence for life by
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making clear how totally beyond our ken the concept is. Certainly the
lack of definition protects the life of people with transplantable hearts far
better than a brain death definition.
Finally, however, proponents of a single definition of death might
point out that at least in cases not involving a presumption of death argu-
ing for no definition is silly. A person cannot live without a heart. There-
fore, if brain death gives rise to the consequence of permitting the "dead"
person's heart to be transplanted, brain death has, for all practical pur-
poses, become the definition of death. Upon transplantation of the heart,
death by cessation of heartbeat and respiration and all the consequences
that ever flow from death will inevitably occur without delay. Such an
argument begs the question, though, by assuming that brain death should
permit transplantation, thus reflecting the favorable view of transplanta-
tion common to the death definers. If we approach the question of vital
organ transplantation with an open mind, we may well decide to dis-
courage, but not prohibit the practice and to protect patients by adopting
a cessation of heartbeat and respiration standard for when vital organs
may be removed. That approach would still leave us free to distribute
an estate, prosecute for homicide or permit a spouse to remarry upon
brain death if we chose to do so.
Thus, the case in favor of defining death comes down to a feeling
that the lack of definition offends a sense of neatness in allowing the law
to use a term whose meaning no one knows. I agree that it is confusing
and aesthetically displeasing to define "death" as meaning different things
in different contexts. However, in view of the manifold advantages of
avoiding definition, a different route to aesthetic satisfaction should be
pursued. The simplest solution lies in recognizing that as there is no
need to define death, so too there is no need for the law to use the term at
all. Professor Capron and Dr. Kass speak of certain consequences follow-
ing from a determination of death." 3 What is important, though, are the
consequences, not the conclusory determination. The law must be able
to determine when each consequence is to occur. Confusion only arises if
the word "death" is used to set the time and if it has several meanings.
No confusion relevant to this discussion inheres in legal rules such as:
"No person's heart may be removed from his body until it has stopped
beating (with or without mechanical assistance) ;" or "Any person who,
for the purpose of depriving another of his ability to function as an inte-
grated conscious being, causes another person to lose that ability (or to
lose the functional ability of his brain) shall be punished (by the most
severe sanction available in this jurisdiction)." The confusion lies in the
103. Capron & Kass, mtpra note 3, at 106.
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use of the concept of death. If the law stops using the concept and seeks
only to describe the cricumstances under which given consequences are
to flow, we shall be able to avoid confusion, face problems head-on with
the hope of resolving them correctly and, of course, obviate the need for
the tidiness of a definition. Such an approach would also relieve us of
the need to distinguish the question of whether a person is dead from the
question whether to allow him to die. Neither question has meaning for
the law, which only needs to know whether a defendant may be con-
victed of the most serious crime, a doctor may remove a heart or an estate
may be probated etc. The concept of death may remain useful for philo-
sophy, religion and literature, but for the law placing death in context
should prove the mortality of death.
